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Summary 
This paper uses published data from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to update an 
index, first developed by Weiler (1983) and modified by LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), of the 
probability that a pro-union worker will be fired in the course of a union election campaign. The 
paper uses the more conservative LaLonde and Meltzer methodology and makes adjustments for the 
rise from the mid-1990s in card-check-based organizing campaigns. We find a steep rise in the 2000s 
relative to the last half of the 1990s in illegal firings of pro-union workers. By 2005, pro-union 
workers involved in union election campaigns faced about a 1.8 percent chance of being illegally 
fired during the course of the campaign. Even after we (over) adjust for the rise in card-check-based 
organizing campaigns, pro-union workers in 2005 appeared to have a 1.4 percent chance of being 
illegally fired. If we assume that employers target union organizers and activists, and that union 
organizers and activists make up about 10 percent of pro-union workers, our estimates suggest that 
almost one-in-five union organizers or activists can expect to be fired as a result of their activities in 
a union election campaign. Even after we adjust for the increase in organizing campaigns not built 
around NLRB-elections, our calculations suggest that about one-in-seven union organizers and 
activists are illegally fired while trying to organize unions at their place of work. 
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Introduction 
The share of U.S. workers in unions has been on the decline for the entire postwar period. In 1948, 
almost one-in-three workers was in a union; by 2005, the fraction had fallen to just one-in-eight (see 
Figure 1). The drop-off in union membership has been particularly stark in the private sector, 
where, by 2005, only about one-in-twelve workers was unionized.1 
Academics, politicians, pundits, employers, union leaders, as well as rank-and-file union members 
themselves have offered a host of explanations for the drop in unionization rates. Perhaps the most 
common is the decline in the importance of manufacturing employment --where unions traditionally 
had their strongest presence. Another frequent interpretation suggests that workers no longer see 
unions as useful or relevant in the new, high-tech, overwhelmingly service-sector, economy. One 
strand of this particular view argues that the leadership of the labor movement has hastened the 
irrelevancy of unions by failing to adapt to long-term structural changes in the economy. A final 
explanation argues that since about 1980, employers --with substantial legal support and cover-- 
have engaged in a systematic attack on unions, especially on union efforts to organize new workers.2 
FIGURE 1 
Union Membership, 1947 – 2005 
(percent of work force) 
Source: Labor Research Associates and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
This paper reviews evidence that provides significant support for the final explanation for union 
decline --that aggressive, even illegal, employer behavior has undermined the ability of U.S. workers 
to create unions at their work places. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) makes it illegal for 
employers to fire workers involved in union-organizing campaigns.3 The penalties associated with 
                                                 
1 That the unionization rate has basically held constant in the public sector suggests that the decline in private-sector 
representation may have more to do with behavior of private-sector employers than preferences of American workers. 
2 See, for example, Freeman and Medoff (1984). 
3 See Weiler (1983) for a discussion of the NLRA. 
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"discriminatory discharges" under the NLRA, however, are small: back pay for illegally fired workers 
minus any earnings that workers had after they were fired.4 Given these small penalties for illegal 
firings, the NLRA, in practice, has given employers a powerful anti-union strategy: fire one or more 
prominent pro-union employees --typically workers involved in organizing the union-- with the hope 
of disrupting the internal workings of the union's campaign, while intimidating the rest of the 
potential bargaining unit in advance of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)-supervised 
representation election.  
The NLRB publishes annual data on its determinations of "discriminatory discharges" in the context 
of union-election campaigns. In this report, we review those data and use a methodology first 
employed by Weiler (1983) and subsequently critiqued and modified by LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) 
to estimate the probability that a pro-union worker is fired in connection with a union-organizing 
election. We also use the same data and related methods to calculate several related indicators of 
employer behavior and union success in union-organizing elections.  
According to the NLRB data, and following LaLonde and Meltzer's methodology, since about 2000, 
pro-union workers involved in union-election campaigns have seen a substantial increase in their 
likelihood of being fired illegally. In the 1970s, a pro-union worker involved in a union-organizing 
campaign faced about a 1-in-100 chance of being fired illegally. The probability of being fired 
reached its historical peak in the first half of the 1980s, with about 1-in-42 pro-union workers being 
fired illegally. From the second half of the 1980s through the second half of the 1990s, the 
likelihood of a being fired declined steadily but remained high, reaching about 1-in-87 pro-union 
workers by the end of the period. From 2000 on, however, the likelihood that a pro-union worker 
would be fired in a union-election campaign has jumped sharply --to about 1 in every 53 pro-union 
workers. 
Weiler (1983) and LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) have emphasized the probability that a pro-union 
worker will be fired in a union-election campaign, but employers engaging in illegal firing activities 
will generally discharge key union activists, rather than random employees believed to be 
sympathetic to the union. If we assume that ten percent of pro-union workers are union activists, 
then we can estimate that in 2005 union activists faced almost a 20 percent chance of being fired 
during a union-election campaign. 
By the mid-1990s, unions appear to have adapted their traditional organizing strategies to reduce the 
scope for employer's ability to fire pro-union workers in an effort to block union-organizing 
campaigns. A key element of the new union strategy involves "card-check" campaigns that seek 
union representation without a formal NLRB election. Even after we make what is probably an 
overly conservative adjustment to the Weiler and LaLonde and Meltzer statistic to take the rise in 
card-check campaigns into account, the NLRB data show a substantial increase during the 2000s in 
illegal firings as an anti-union strategy. 
 
                                                 
4 See Dunlop Commission (1994), Chapter 3, p. 71. In 1990, the Dunlop Commission notes, "...the average back pay 
award amounted to $2,749 per discharge." 
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The Data and Methodology 
Each year, the NLRB publishes data on the progress and outcomes of a wide range of legal actions 
connected with the NLRA. The published data include detailed information on the outcomes of 
union-organizing elections and investigations of "discriminatory discharges" under the NLRA.  
In the early 1980s, Harvard Law School professor Paul Weiler (1983) used three decades of the 
NLRB's published data to estimate the probability that a pro-union worker involved in a union 
organizing campaign would be the victim of a discriminatory discharge. The NLRB annual reports 
provided data that allowed Weiler to estimate both the number of workers that were fired illegally 
(as determined by NLRB's rulings after reviewing cases brought before it) and the number of pro-
union workers involved in union election campaigns over roughly the same period of time as the 
discriminatory discharges. Weiler's review of the data and his particular methodology led him to 
conclude that, in 1980, the "...odds are about one in twenty that a union supporter will be fired for 
exercising rights supposedly guaranteed by federal law a half-century ago."5 
Economist Robert LaLonde and law professor Bernard Meltzer, both of the University of Chicago, 
however, disputed aspects of Weiler's methodology and published an extensive critique and re-
examination of the data in 1991 (LaLonde and Meltzer, 1991).6 The main thrust of their technical 
criticisms was that Weiler's methodology tended to overstate the number of workers that were 
discharged in connection with union-election campaigns (primarily because, in LaLonde and 
Meltzer's view, an important portion of fired workers were fired in contexts other than union-
organizing campaigns). LaLonde and Meltzer suggested and implemented several changes to 
Weiler's methodology and concluded that the probability that a pro-union worker would be fired in 
connection with a union-election campaign was between 50 and 70 percent lower than originally 
calculated by Weiler.7 LaLonde and Meltzer, for example, concluded that in 1980 the odds were 
about one-in-sixty-three that a pro-union worker faced discriminatory discharge in connection with a 
union election, compared to the 1-in-20 odds calculated by Weiler from the same data.8 
In this report, we follow the more conservative methodology proposed by LaLonde and Meltzer, 
and use the last fifteen years of NLRB data to update their earlier work. The basic strategy involves 
using published data from the NLRB on "remedial actions taken in unfair labor practice cases 
closed," the "final outcome of representation elections in cases closed," and "valid votes cast in 
representation elections in cases closed" to produce annual estimates of both the number of workers 
fired illegally ("discriminatory discharges") and the number of pro-union workers involved in union-
election campaigns. Together, these two figures allow us to calculate the probability that a pro-union 
worker is fired illegally in connection with a union-election campaign.9 
                                                 
5 Weiler, 1983, p. 1781. He continues: "Such a widespread pattern of employer intimidation has ramifications that reach 
far beyond the units in which discharges actually occur. It fosters an environment in which employees will take very 
seriously even subtle warnings about the consequences of joining a union." 
6 For Weiler's response to LaLonde and Meltzer, see Weiler (1991). 
7 Compare panels A and B in LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), Table 7.  
8 LaLonde and Meltzer note: "Even the 1 in 63 ratio manifestly represents a serious denial of statutory rights to 
individual employees and a potentially serious impediment to effective union organization." (p. 992) 
9 Following an October 20, 2006, telephone conversation with Patricia Gilbert, Associate Director of the NLRB's 
Division of Information, we have excluded as almost certainly inaccurate the extremely high illegal firings and related 
data from 1994. 
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The NLRB does not report the number of workers fired illegally in connection with union election 
campaigns. The NLRB, however, does give the total number of cases closed each year that ended 
with the NLRB ordering the reinstatement of fired workers. Following LaLonde and Meltzer (1991, 
pp. 990-98), we assume that 51 percent of these cases each year corresponded to dismissals during 
union-election campaigns.10 Also following LaLonde and Meltzer, we assume that each case 
involved, on average, 2.2 workers.11 In order to estimate the number of workers fired illegally during 
union election campaigns in 2000,12 for example, we first take the number of "employees offered 
reinstatement" in that year (1,224 cases) and multiply that number by 0.51, to find the total number 
of reinstatement offers that were connected to a union election campaign (624 cases). We then 
multiply our estimate of the total number of cases with illegal firings by 2.2 employees per case to 
arrive at the total number of workers illegally fired in connection with a union election campaign: 
1,373. 
Once we have an estimate of the total number of illegal firings connected to union-election 
campaigns, we can easily calculate the likelihood that a pro-union worker will be fired during a 
union-election campaign. The NLRB annual reports provide detailed breakdowns of voting in 
union-representation elections.13 Following Weiler (1983) and LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), we take 
the total number of pro-union voters (in all elections, regardless of the outcome of the election) 
from the NLRB and use this to calculate a crude "probability" that a pro-union worker will be fired. 
Continuing with the example of the year 2000, the NLRB data show 100,815 workers voted in favor 
of union representation in NLRB elections.14 The ratio of 1,373 illegally fired employees to 100,815 
pro-union workers in union election campaigns yields the probability that a pro-union worker loses 
his or her job during a union election campaign: 1,373/100,815, or 1.4 percent, which represents 
about one in every 73 pro-union workers. 
Several features of the data and methodology could act to raise or lower our estimates relative to the 
true level of illegal firings connected to union-organizing campaigns. The first issue concerns our 
decision to count as illegally fired only those workers who were offered reinstatement by the NLRB. 
By limiting our analysis only to those workers to whom the NLRB offered reinstatement, we likely 
understate the number of illegal firings relative to the true number. Discriminatory discharge cases 
typically follow a particular pattern. Workers initially file a formal complaint with the NLRB; then, 
after reviewing the case, the NLRB's General Counsel decides whether the case has merit; and, 
finally, the NLRB decides whether to find that an unlawful discharge took place and, if so, whether 
to issue an order for reinstatement and back pay. Since employers may agree to settle some portion 
of cases with merit after the second stage and before the final decision by the NLRB, our decision to 
                                                 
10 LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) found that: "... 50 percent of the [NLRB's] reinstatement orders were based on employer 
violations during organizational drives." (p. 990) In a subsequent footnote (134, p. 991), they indicate that the 50 
percent figure was rounded from 0.51. 
11 LaLonde and Meltzer base their estimate of 2.2 workers per case on a GAO review of a sample of NLRB cases. 
According to LaLonde and Meltzer, the GAO derived the figure "...by dividing the number of employees allegedly 
discharged during organizational drives (394) by the number of complaints alleging such firings (176)." (p. 991, 
footnote 136) 
12 All NLRB data reported here refer to fiscal years of the federal government. 
13 We take the rest of the data we report, including the number of pro-union voters in union election campaigns, 
directly from the NLRB's Tables 13 and 14. 
14 See NLRB Annual Report 2000, Table 14; of these 100,815 votes in favor of union representation, 61,466 were cast 
in "RC" elections where the union won; 38,539 were cast in "RC" elections where the union lost; 614, in "RM" 
elections where the union won; and 373 in "RM" elections where the union lost. 
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count as illegal firings only those cases where the NLRB issued an order for reinstatement likely 
leads us to understate the true number of illegally fired workers.15 
A second data issue is that we cannot distinguish between union-organizing campaigns that 
culminated in an election and union-organizing campaigns that were abandoned before an election 
was held.16 This feature of the data will have the effect of increasing the number of illegally 
discharged workers per union-organizing election since some portion of the workers were fired 
illegally during campaigns that did not result in an election.17 As LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) 
explain: "...the numerator includes discharges during all phases of an organizational campaign, 
whereas the denominator measures the number of organizational campaigns by the number of 
elections. Because not all organizing drives lead to a petition, let alone an election, the number of 
organizational campaigns is greater than the number of NLRB elections. Hence, the ... figure derived 
... may well overstate the frequency of discriminatory discharges aimed at averting unionization." (p. 
991) 
Third, the NLRB procedures to handle discriminatory discharge complaints take time, often more 
than a year, which means that some of the cases of illegal firings that were closed in a particular year 
may actually reflect cases concerning employer actions taken in an earlier year. This mismatch will 
likely lead our estimates of illegal firings to overstate the true number in some years and understate 
the true number in other years. To diminish the effects of these procedural lags, we sometimes use 
three-year trailing averages to summarize illegal firing activity. 
Finally, our analysis applies only to workers covered by the NLRA. The NLRA does not cover 
public-sector workers and some workers in the private sector, most notably agricultural laborers and 
workers covered by the Railway Labor Act. As a result, our estimates exclude workers fired for 
union activity in these uncovered sectors, but also excludes pro-union workers in these sectors. 
                                                 
15 See LaLonde and Meltzer, p. 990. We may also understate the number of illegal firings because some illegally fired 
workers may choose not appeal to the NLRB because the potential gains --reinstatement and back pay (less any 
interim earnings) may be small relative to the cost and inconvenience involved in pressing their case. 
16 A related issue is the potential impact on our numbers of a decision by unions to plan organizing campaigns around 
"card-check" recognition rather than an NLRB election. If unions decided to increase systematically the use of this 
organizing route, and employers resisted card-check campaigns by engaging in illegal firings in the same way that they 
would have in more standard NLRB election, then our estimate of illegal firings per pro-union worker in an NLRB 
election would rise, even though the true probability of being fired was unchanged. 
17 See LaLonde and Meltzer, p. 991. 
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The Rise of Card Check Organizing Strategies 
Finally, an increasing reliance on "card-check" organizing strategies complicates both the calculation 
and interpretation of our findings. Beginning in the mid-1960s, unions began to adapt more 
aggressively and more successfully to employer "union avoidance" strategies. An important 
component of these strategic changes by unions was a shift away from the traditional NLRB election 
process toward organizing campaigns centered around "card-check" recognition. In a traditional 
organizing campaign, unions collect a signed card from a majority of the eligible workers at an 
establishment asking for union representation. The union then presents these cards to management, 
which generally requests that the NLRB supervise an election with a secret ballot in order to verify 
the outcome of the union card collection. The period between the time when unions present 
management with the signed cards and the actual NLRB-supervised election is typically the most 
active period for employers that engage in aggressive and illegal anti-union behavior, including illegal 
firings. Employers, however, also have the option to recognize the union based only on the results 
of union card collection, without having to verify the results by a secret ballot. While the decision to 
recognize the union after an initial card check and before a formal election resides solely with 
employers, unions have developed organizing strategies around bringing pressure against employers 
to recognize the union at the time of the card check, which is often the first time that the employer 
learns of the union's efforts to organize a workplace. The advantages for the unions are clear, 
including avoiding private employer meetings with workers, threats of plant closings, and illegal 
firings. The advantages for employers, even strongly anti-union employers, can also be significant, 
especially if the union organizing campaign has succeeded in building a solid internal organizing 
structure and has managed to marshal significant outside support for the organizing campaign (for 
example, from community groups, religious organizations, local politicians, and others).18 
The move away from traditional NLRB-supervised elections to card check affects our calculations, 
and especially the interpretation of our calculations, in complex ways. One interpretation of the 
exercise we're performing here is that we are attempting to create an index of underlying employer 
aggressiveness with respect to unions. Our main indicator of that unobserved condition is 
employers' willingness to fire workers illegally for union-organizing activity. For the period prior to 
the mid-1990s when unions primarily pursued NLRB-election focused strategies, the incidence of 
illegal firings was a reasonable and consistent proxy for underlying employer aggressiveness. In the 
mid-1990s, however, directly in response to sustained employer aggressiveness, unions changed 
strategies, in part, explicitly to reduce the likelihood that employers would fire pro-union activists 
involved in election-oriented organizing campaigns.  
This change in union strategy will affect both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio of 
illegally fired workers to pro-union workers, which is the main focus of our analysis here. To the 
extent that the union strategy was successful, the shift to card check after the mid-1990s will have 
reduced the incidence of illegal firings. This lowers the numerator in the ratio, reducing the apparent 
probability that a pro-union worker will be fired illegally. But, the resulting decline in illegal firings 
under these circumstances is not the result of a decline in anti-union behavior by employers, but 
rather the result of an adaptive strategy employed by unions. Without any modifications or 
reinterpretations, our simple indicator of employer aggressiveness may give misleading results after 
the mid-1990s swing to card-check, by suggesting that anti-union behavior by employers is on the 
                                                 
18 For a discussion of "union avoidance" strategies, see Levitt (1993) and Smith (2003); for a discussion of threats of 
plant closings, see Bronfenbrenner (2000, 2001); for a discussion of the strategic response of organized labor from the 
1990s on, see Bronfenbrenner, Friedman, Hurd, Oswald, and Seeber (1998) and Brudney (2005). 
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decline, when what is really happening is that unions have simply been more effective in 
counteracting a particular set of employer behaviors. 
The new union organizing strategy will also affect the denominator of the ratio. The card-check 
strategy has explicitly sought to avoid NLRB-supervised elections, which will have the effect of 
lowering the number of elections and therefore the number of votes cast in favor of unions. Since 
the number of votes cast in favor of unions is our proxy for the number of pro-union workers 
involved in organizing campaigns, the decline in the number of elections (relative to the total 
number of newly organized workers), all else constant, will act to increase the probability that a 
worker faces illegal firing conditional on supporting a union-organizing campaign. 
We have several possible ways to address the issues raised by the change in the mid-1990s in union-
organizing strategies. One option is to do nothing other than to clarify the meaning of our principal 
statistics. The procedures initially proposed by Weiler (1983) and LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), and 
later adopted by the Dunlop Commission (1994), continue to capture accurately the number of 
illegally fired workers per pro-union worker involved in an election-based union-organizing campaign. Unions 
are now less likely to take an organizing effort to an NLRB-election, but when unions do pursue a 
more traditional election-based strategy, our statistic captures employer opposition reasonably well, 
and arguably as well as it always has. 
A second approach involves attempting to "correct" for the decline in union elections. Below we 
report adjusted numbers that effectively add the estimated pro-union portion of workers involved in 
card-check campaigns back into the total pool of pro-union workers that voted in NLRB elections. 
This is not entirely satisfactory, however, because while we can fairly easily add workers involved in 
card-check campaigns back into our calculations, we don't know how also to add back in the 
workers who would have been illegally fired if the union had decided to conduct an NLRB election rather 
than a card-check campaign.19 We note that probably the best easily available estimate of these 
counterfactual illegal firings would be to assume that the likelihood of being fired in the absence of 
card check would be identical to the probability of being fired in the actual election-based campaigns 
that did take place. If we took this approach, however, we would end up effectively with the first 
option above --doing nothing-- since we would be making proportional additions to the numerator 
and the denominator, leaving our "adjusted" estimates identical to the unadjusted ones. In what we 
report below, however, we only adjust the denominator in the main ratio of interest. We add a 
portion of workers involved in card-check campaigns back into our estimate of pro-union workers, 
but make no adjustment to the number of workers who were illegally fired.20 This has the 
unambiguous effect of lowering our estimate of the probability of a pro-union worker illegally losing 
his or her job relative to not making the adjustment. 
                                                 
19 Eaton and Kriesky (2001) "...find strong evidence that card-check agreements reduced management campaigning, as 
well as the use of illegal tactics such as discharges and promises of benefits, and also substantially increased the union 
recognition rate." 
20 See Appendix Table 2 and related discussion for a description of how we adjust the number of pro-union workers. 
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Illegal Firings Since the Mid‐1970s 
In this section, we review the trends in illegal firings from the mid-1970s to the present using our 
own analysis of the NLRB data. In the next section, we combine our own analysis with analysis of 
earlier periods by LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) and the Dunlop Commission (1994) to analyze 
trends over the period from 1951 to the present.21 
TABLE 1 
Illegal Firings during Union Organizing Campaigns, 1951-2005 
 
Discriminatory 
Firings 
Total  
Pro-Union 
Voters 
Pro-Union 
Voters per Fired 
Union Supporter
Probability 
Pro-Union Worker Fired 
in Campaign (percent) 
Elections with 
Illegal Firing 
(percent) 
Elections Won 
by Unions 
(percent) 
Elections 
Held by 
NLRB 
 
(a) LaLonde & Meltzer (1991) results 
1964-69 1,371 n.a. 209 0.5 8 59 7,698 
1970-74 1,342 n.a. 196 0.5 7 54 8,298 
1975-79 1,942 n.a. 110 0.9 11 49 7,884 
1980-84 2,812 n.a. 57 1.8 20 46 5,049 
1985-88 2,483 n.a. 36 2.8 32 48 3,559 
        
(b) LaLonde & Meltzer (1991) time periods, authors’ data 
1975-79 1,942 212,708 114 0.9 11 49 7,884 
1980-84 2,812 129,082 51 2.3 27 46 5,049 
1985-88 2,483 90,023 40 2.8 32 48 3,559 
        
(c) Dunlop Commission (1994) 
1951-55 608 n.a. 689 0.1 5 75 n.a. 
1956-60 429 n.a. 584 0.2 4 59 n.a. 
1961-65 1,019 n.a. 272 0.4 8 56 n.a. 
1966-70 1,346 n.a. 225 0.4 8 54 n.a. 
1971-75 1,473 n.a. 171 0.6 8 43 n.a. 
1976-80 2,238 n.a. 92 1.1 14 37 n.a. 
1981-85 2,855 n.a. 38 2.6 32 38 n.a. 
1986-90 1,967 n.a. 48 2.1 25 38 n.a. 
        
(d) Authors’ time periods, authors’ data 
1974-80 2,099 212,478 108 1.0 12 49 7,869 
1981-85 2,756 107,041 42 2.7 31 46 4,339 
1986-90 1,967 94,552 54 2.1 25 49 3,580 
1991-95 1,606 81,751 60 2.0 24 49 3,035 
1996-00 1,092 93,365 87 1.2 16 51 3,071 
2001-05 1,389 73,977 53 1.9 25 57 2,485 
        
(e) Authors time periods, authors’ data, adjusted for rise in card-check 
1996-00 1,429 116,356 108 1.0 25 55 2,629 
2001-05 1,169 96,170 69 1.4 23 60 2,267 
                
Notes: Authors' analysis of NLRB data, following LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), Table 7; Dunlop (1994), Exhibit III-1, following 
Table 7. See notes to Appendix Table 1. For adjustments in (e), see Appendix Table 2 and text. 
 
                                                 
21 For the legal and institutional backdrop, see Bronfenbrenner (2000, 2001), Compa (2004), Dunlop Commission 
(1994), Freeman (2004), and Pope (2004). 
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Table 1 summarizes our results, along with those of LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) and the Dunlop 
Commission (1994), over approximately five-year periods from 1951 to the present. A comparison 
of the first two panels of the table show a close match between LaLonde and Meltzer's original 
published results and our own replication of their results using the NLRB data across three time 
periods from 1974.22  
From the first period in LaLonde and Meltzer's analysis, 1964-69, through the last period that they 
analyzed, 1985-88, the probability that a pro-union worker would be fired during an organizing 
election increased by more than a factor of five --from about a 0.5 percent chance of being fired in 
1964-69 to a 2.8 percent chance in 1985-88. Our extension of the LaLonde and Meltzer analysis 
through 2005 suggests that the probability of being illegally fired peaked in the first half of the 
1980s, at a 2.7 percent rate, and then fell steadily through the last half of the 1990s, to 1.2 percent. 
The first half of the 2000s, however, saw a substantial resurgence in the rate of union firings to a 1.9 
percent rate, or about 1-in-53 pro-union workers involved in a union-election campaign. Figure 2 
shows our annual data (smoothed using a three-year trailing moving average) for the period 1976-
2005, and demonstrates a substantial jump in the incidence of illegal firing per pro-union worker.23 
FIGURE 2  
Probability Pro-Union Worker  is Fired During Election Campaign, 1976-2005 
(unadjusted and adjusted for rise in non-NLRB election campaigns) 
(percent; three-year trailing moving average) 
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
1975 1985 1995 2005
Unadjusted
Adjusted
 
Source: Authors' analysis of National Labor Relations Board data. 
 
Both Table 1 and Figure 2 also report our crude adjustment for the rise in card-check organizing 
campaigns. Our adjustment lowers the probability that a pro-union worker will be fired in 
connection with a union-organizing campaign in the two relevant periods 1996-2000 (from 1.2 
                                                 
22 The only differences between our numbers and those of LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) stem from rounding errors, 
which are exaggerated by taking the inversion of probabilities --Weiler (1983) and LaLonde and Meltzer's (1991) 
preferred method of reporting their results. For example, 1/0.0125 is 80; while 1/0.013 rounds to 77. 
23 See Appendix Table 1 for the annual data used to produce both Table 1 and Figure 2. 
            Dropping the Ax: Illegal Firings During Union Election Campaigns z  11 
 
percent to 1.0 percent) and 2001-2005 (from 1.9 percent to 1.4 percent). The adjustment, however, 
does not affect the trend over time: both the adjusted and unadjusted data show a sharp climb in 
illegal firings over the last five years. 
Weiler (1983) and LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) have emphasized the probability that a pro-union 
worker will be fired in a union-election campaign. Employers, however, are unlikely to fire workers 
randomly, or simply for expressing pro-union views. Employers maximize the return to illegal firing 
by focusing on union activists. If we assume that ten percent of pro-union workers are union 
activists, and that employers target union activists, then we estimate that in 2005 union activists 
faced about an 18 percent chance of being fired during a union-election campaign. If union activists 
represent 20 percent of all pro-union workers, then the probability that an activist is fired illegally in 
a union election campaign would be about 9 percent. If union activists represent only five percent of 
pro-union workers, then the probability that an activist is fired would rise to about 36 percent.24 
FIGURE 3 
Union Victories in Election Campaigns, 1976-2005 
(percent; three-year trailing moving average) 
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Source: Authors' analysis of National Labor Relations Board data. 
 
Other data published by the NLRB allows us to put these trends in illegal firings in a broader 
context. Figure 3, for example, indicates that unions saw a steep decline in success in 
representational elections from at least the mid-1970s (just over a 50 percent success rate) through 
the early 1980s (less than a 45 percent rate). Unions then experienced a gradual improvement from 
the early 1980s through the mid-1990s (back up to about 50 percent), and finally a steep rise through 
2005 (to over a 60 percent victory rate). Figure 4 suggests that an important reason for the sharp 
increase in union success in representation elections may have been a shift to more selective 
election-based organizing campaigns. Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, both the number 
of union-representation elections and the number of workers involved in those elections 
                                                 
24 Our estimates are broadly in line with survey evidence collected by Bronfenbrenner (1996), who found firings in 
about one-third of certification elections between 1993 and 1995. 
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plummeted. From the mid-1980s on, the number of union elections (and the number of workers) 
involved continued to fall, albeit more gradually. 
FIGURE 4 
Union Elections and Total Pro-Union Voters, 1976-2005 
(three-year trailing moving average) 
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Source: Authors' analysis of National Labor Relations Board data. 
 
The net result of the rise in union election victories, on the one hand, and the decline in the number 
of workers involved in elections, on the other hand, was a large drop in the number of newly 
represented workers as a share of the total work force. As Figure 5 shows, in the mid-1970s, unions 
were organizing about 0.25 percent of the total work force each year through union elections. By the 
mid-1980s, however, the figure had fallen below 0.1 percent, and has declined gradually ever since. 
The peak period in illegal firing activity --the early 1980s-- coincided with the period of most-rapid 
decline in the share of newly represented workers.25 
 
                                                 
25 This representation of the data --newly organized workers through NLRB elections as a share of the total work force-
- is one that appears in LaLonde and Meltzer (1991). We should be clear that an important share of potentially union 
workers fall outside the jurisdiction of the NLRB and NLRB-supervised elections, most notably, workers in the public 
sector. The rise in card-check organizing campaigns from the mid-1990s further reduced the apparent rate of union 
organizing successes since workers involved in successful card-check campaigns would not appear in the measure here 
of "newly organized workers." 
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FIGURE 5 
Newly Represented Employees in NLRB Elections as Share of Work Force, 1974-2005  
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Source: Authors' analysis of NLRB and BLS data. 
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Longer‐term Trends 
In this section, we combine our direct analysis of the NLRB data for 1974-2005 with a similar 
analysis of the NLRB data by the Dunlop Commission (1994), which allows us to analyze trends, in 
five-year increments, over the period 1951-2005. A comparison of the third (Dunlop Commission) 
and fourth (our data) panels of Table 1 shows roughly similar results in both the Dunlop 
Commission and our own analysis of the NLRB data for the 1981-85 and 1986-90 periods, which 
are common to both analyses. 
The addition of data for the 1950s, 1960s, and the first half of the 1970s reinforces the patterns 
observed in our earlier review of the 1974-2005 period. Figure 6 displays a long, gradual increase 
from the 1950s through the early 1980s in the probability that a pro-union worker would be fired 
illegally in connection with a union-election campaign.26 Figure 7 shows that the share of union-
representation election averaged about 75 percent in the first half of the 1950s, but fell to just 37 
percent by the second half of the 1970s. The number of union-representation elections was rising 
from the second half of the 1950s (see Figure 8) through the first half of the 1970s and, as we saw 
before, dropped sharply in the first half of the 1980s. 
As Figure 9 demonstrates, the net result of the two interacting forces ― the fall in the number of 
union-representation elections and the rise in the share won by unions ― was a steep and regular 
decline in newly represented workers as a share of the total work force, from the early 1950s, when 
newly represented workers made up 1.3 percent of the total workforce each year, to about 0.1 
percent by the second half of the 1980s (and continuing through to today).27 
FIGURE 6 
Probability Pro-Union Worker is Fired During Election Campaign, 1951-2005 
(adjusted and unadjusted for card-check organizing campaigns, 1996-2005) 
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26 LaLonde and Meltzer (1991) argue that, for technical and institutional reasons, the NLRB data overstate the rise in 
illegal firings during union election campaigns between the 1950s and the 1980s. Figure 6 also displays the data 
adjusted and unadjusted for the rise in card-check organizing campaigns. 
27 See footnote 24. 
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Source: Dunlop's (1994) and authors' analysis of NLRB data. 
 
FIGURE 7 
Union Victories in Election Campaigns, 1951-2005 
75
59
56 54
43
37
46
49 49 51
57
0
20
40
60
80
1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05
Pe
rc
en
t
 
Source: Dunlop's (1994) and authors' analysis of NLRB data. 
 
FIGURE 8 
Union Elections, 1950-2005 
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FIGURE 9 
Newly Represented Employees in NLRB Elections as Share of Work Force, 1950-2005  
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Source: Authors' analysis of NLRB, BLS data, and LaLonde and Meltzer (1991). 
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Conclusion 
Starting at the end of the 1970s, but especially by the early 1980s, American employers began to 
engage in the systematic and widespread use of illegal firings as a strategy to undermine the success 
of campaigns for union representation. At the peak in the early 1980s, almost three percent of pro-
union workers involved in union-election campaigns were fired illegally in connection with those 
campaigns. From that peak in the early 1980s, the rate of illegal firings fell smoothly through the end 
of the 1990s, though remained high by earlier standards. From about 2000 on, however, the rate of 
illegal firings jumped sharply again. The increase in illegal firings holds even after we control for the 
rise in card-check-based union organizing campaigns, adopted in direct response to more aggressive 
anti-union tactics carried out by employers. 
Using the conservative methodology proposed by LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), we estimate that by 
2005, pro-union workers involved in a union-organizing campaign faced an almost two percent 
chance in being fired. After applying an inherently conservative adjustment for the effects of card-
check campaigns, we estimate that pro-union workers involved in union-organizing campaigns that 
year faced a 1.4 percent chance of being fired. Since employers have a strong incentive to fire union 
organizers and activists, these figures translate to very high probabilities that organizers and activists 
will be fired in any given unionization campaign. If one-in-ten union supporters is an activist or an 
organizer, our calculations suggest that in 2005, union organizers and activists face a 15 to 20 
percent chance of being fired. 
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Data Appendix 
Appendix Table 1 shows the annual data used to prepare Figures 2 through 5. 
APPENDIX TABLE 1 
Illegal Firings During Union Organizing Campaigns, 1974-2005 
   
Pro-Union Voters per 
Fired Union Supporter
Probability  Pro-Union 
Worker  Fired in 
Campaign (percent)    
 
Discrim-
inatory 
Firings 
Total  
Pro-Union 
Voters Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
Elections with 
Illegal Firing 
(percent) 
Elections Won 
by Unions 
(percent) 
Elections 
Held by 
NLRB 
 
1974 1,785 223,906 125 125 0.8 0.8 9.7 51.1 8,368 
1975 1,719 238,774 139 139 0.7 0.7 9.7 49.6 8,061 
1976 1,520 186,706 123 123 0.8 0.8 8.6 49.7 8,027 
1977 1,666 226,447 136 136 0.7 0.7 8.8 48.2 8,635 
1978 1,950 181,342 93 93 1.1 1.1 11.9 48.1 7,433 
1979 2,853 230,270 81 81 1.2 1.2 17.8 47.2 7,266 
1980 3,199 199,900 62 62 1.6 1.6 19.9 47.9 7,296 
1981 2,605 166,965 64 64 1.6 1.6 17.8 45.4 6,656 
1982 2,360 103,282 44 44 2.3 2.3 25.3 43.7 4,247 
1983 1,472 75,610 51 51 1.9 1.9 19.2 47.7 3,483 
1984 3,971 99,651 25 25 4.0 4.0 50.7 46.5 3,561 
1985 3,373 89,699 27 27 3.8 3.8 40.9 46.5 3,749 
1986 1,406 92,135 66 66 1.5 1.5 17.4 47.5 3,663 
1987 2,755 87,696 32 32 3.1 3.1 37.8 48.5 3,314 
1988 2,398 90,561 38 38 2.6 2.6 31.1 49.5 3,509 
1989 2,118 106,515 50 50 2.0 2.0 25.4 49.5 3,791 
1990 1,158 95,853 83 83 1.2 1.2 14.5 49.5 3,623 
1991 2,870 81,214 28 28 3.5 3.5 41.0 46.9 3,179 
1992 1,197 75,959 63 63 1.6 1.6 18.2 49.8 2,993 
1993 1,451 90,331 62 62 1.6 1.6 21.6 50.4 3,055 
1994 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1995 905 79,500 88 88 1.1 1.1 14.1 50.4 2,911 
1996 1,020 79,935 78 86 1.3 1.2 16.6 47.3 2,792 
1997 1,067 91,044 85 102 1.2 1.0 15.8 50.4 3,075 
1998 1,039 96,046 92 120 1.1 0.8 14.1 51.2 3,339 
1999 960 98,986 103 134 1.0 0.7 13.8 53.0 3,162 
2000 1,373 100,815 73 95 1.4 1.0 20.9 51.8 2,988 
2001 1,409 82,403 58 76 1.7 1.3 23.6 54.2 2,714 
2002 1,410 75,455 54 70 1.9 1.4 24.4 56.2 2,627 
2003 1,497 74,295 50 65 2.0 1.5 27.0 56.8 2,516 
2004 1,457 72,181 50 64 2.0 1.6 28.8 56.6 2,299 
2005 1,169 65,551 56 73 1.8 1.4 23.4 60.5 2,267 
                      
Notes: Authors' analysis of NLRB data, following LaLonde and Meltzer (1991), Table 7. The number of discriminatory  
discharge  cases for 1982 are “not available this year due to technical problems” (NLRB, 1982 Annual Report, p. 268).  
We estimate here as number of  victims of discrimination offered reinstatement that year (6,332) over the average number  
of victims of  discrimination per case over the period 1978-86 (approximately 3). The NLRB believes that the published  
data for 1994 contain an error (telephone conversation, October 20, 2006), and we have therefore excluded 1994. 
For adjustment procedure from 1996 on, see Appendix Table 2 and text.  
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Appendix Table 2 summarizes the procedure used to adjust the data on pro-union workers from 
1996 through 2005, a period that saw a substantial increase in non-NLRB-election organizing 
campaigns, in order to attempt to make the more recent data more directly comparable with the 
earlier data. 
APPENDIX TABLE 2 
Adjustment factor for post-1995 data for decline in relative importance of NLRB elections 
Newly Organized NLRB Elections Newly Organized 
Workers 
Estimated Newly 
Organized Workers in 
Private Sector Share of Private Sector
 ILR WIP 
Estimated 
Share in 
Private Sector
ILR WIP Total ILR WIP 
         
1998 500,000 -- 0.574 287,027 -- 100,535 0.350 -- 
1999 600,000 474,140 0.572 342,987 271,040 112,291 0.327 0.414 
2000 400,000 160,793 0.563 225,071 90,474 120,525 0.535 1.332 
2001 400,000 446,039 0.560 223,975 249,754 95,408 0.426 0.382 
2002 523,000 230,231 0.545 285,049 125,482 88,481 0.310 0.705 
2003 400,000 140,991 0.536 214,300 75,536 87,499 0.408 1.158 
         
Average      0.393 0.798 
         
Addendum:        
         
Average all:        0.596 
Scaling factor assuming no card check prior to 1996: 0.404 
Scaling factor assuming 10 percent card check prior to 1996: 0.304 
                  
Notes: Authors' analysis. ILR refers to data from AFL-CIO cited in Brudney (2005, footnote 45) in the Iowa Law 
Review. WIP refers to data from the AFL-CIO's weekly publication "Work in Progress," various issues. The 
estimated share of newly organized workers in the private sector assumes that the share among newly organized 
workers is proportional to the share in the existing stock of unionized workers; data from Labor Research 
Association online (www.laborresearch.org) and BLS, Union Members Summary, various years. 
 
 
 
The first step is to get an estimate of the total number of newly organized private-sector workers 
each year, not just those organized through NLRB elections. We found two sources for this figure. 
One is unpublished information supplied by the AFL-CIO to Brudney (2005, footnote 45) (column 
one); the other are estimates for 1999 through 2003 compiled by and published in "Work In 
Progress," an AFL-CIO newsletter (column two). Both sets of estimates include workers in the 
public sector and a few other sectors not covered by NLRB elections. In the absence of better 
estimates, we assume that the share of the total newly organized workers who were in the private 
sector, and therefore probably covered by the NLRB, was proportional to the share of private-sector 
workers in total union membership in the same year (column three). The resulting estimates of 
newly organized workers in the private sector appear in columns four (based on Brudney) and five 
(based on "Work In Progress"). We then take the total number of newly organized workers who 
were organized through NLRB elections (column six) and present this number as a share of the total 
estimated number of private-sector workers in each year. This gives us two sets of estimates 
(columns seven and eight) of the share of newly organized private-sector workers who were 
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organized through NLRB elections. Since the data appear to be noisy and show no obvious trend, 
we take the average over all years of both sets of estimates and conclude that NLRB elections 
covered about 60 percent of potentially eligible private-sector workers over the period, leaving about 
40 percent organized outside of the traditional NLRB-election procedures. We assumed that about 
10 percent of workers had been organized outside these procedures in earlier years, and ended up 
with a scaling factor of 30 percent.  
We note that both the AFL-CIO data in Brudney and the "Work in Progress" data we use have 
several limitations. First, the data are compiled exclusively from successful organizing campaigns, 
and the data do not allow us to distinguish between pro- and anti-union workers participating in 
successful campaigns. The NLRB data allow us to include pro-union workers from failed elections 
as well as to exclude anti-union workers from successful elections. Since these limitations have 
contradictory effects on our calculations --the exclusion of pro-union workers in unsuccessful 
campaigns reduces our estimate of pro-union workers, while the inclusion of anti-union workers in 
successful campaigns increases our estimate of pro-union workers-- the net effect of this limitation 
on our estimates is not clear. Second, the Brudney and the "Work in Progress" data do not include 
information on illegal firings, including illegal firings related to card-check campaigns (for example, 
as is common in the building trades where high worker mobility means that unions and workers 
frequently choose not to pursue violations of this type). So, our proposed adjustment to the ratio of 
illegally fired workers to union supporters adds workers to the denominator of the ratio without 
making any adjustment to the numerator. The result of this limitation is to make our correction a 
conservative estimate of the likelihood of being fired. 
We used the resulting scaling factor to produce our estimates of the probability of illegal firing by 
multiplying the actual number of pro-union workers in the years 1998 through 2005 by 1.3; to 
"phase in" the scaling factor, we multiplied the NLRB-reported pro-union workers by 1.1 in 1996 
and 1.2 in 1997.  
